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We study analytically and by computer simulations a complex system of adaptive agents with
finite memory. Borrowing the framework of the Minority Game and using the replica formalism we
show the existence of an equilibrium phase transition as a function of the ratio between the memory
λ and the learning rates Γ of the agents. We show that, starting from a random configuration, a
dynamic phase transition also exists, which prevents the system from reaching any Nash equilibria.
Furthermore, in a non-stationary environment, we show by numerical simulations that agents with
infinite memory play worst than others with less memory and that the dynamic transition naturally
arises independently from the initial conditions.
Social interactions pose many coordination problems
to individuals. Generally social agents face problems of
sharing and distributing limited resources in an optimal
way. Examples range from the use of public roads and
the Internet, to exchanging what we produce with what
we consume. A solution to problem of this kind invokes
the intervention of a public authority who finds the social
optimum and imposes or suggests the optimal behavior
to agents. While such a solution may be easy to find, its
implementation may be difficult to enforce in practical
situations.
Self-enforcing solutions – where agents achieve optimal
allocation of resources while pursuing their self-interests,
without explicit communication or agreement with others
– are of great practical importance. Competitive markets
are the prototypical example of such a solution: With
everybody maximizing his own profit and no one really
caring for global optimality, competitive markets perform
the remarkable task of leading to system wide optimality.
Micro-economics and Game Theory have gone quite
far in explaining what equilibria can one expect in social
interactions. However most of these studies deal with un-
realistic cases with either few players or with many, but
identical, agents. Secondly the analysis is restricted to
the equilibria which deductively rational players would
agree upon. Such an approach seems unrealistic in cases
involving many individuals with different goals and char-
acteristics. The computational complexity required by
deductive rationality may easily go far beyond the capa-
bilities of agents. Inductive thinking, as suggested by
Arthur [1], may be a more suited model of how real
people behave. A growing effort has indeed been put
in recent years in understanding under what conditions
bounded inductively rational agents may reach optimal
outcomes [2,3]. Several learning rules have been found
to lead to optimal outcomes when a single agent “plays”
against nature [4]. Similar results hold for games with
few players, even though non-trivial dynamical effects
can also arise [2].
In this letter we address the problem of how many
heterogeneous adaptive agents learn to coordinate in a
complex, eventually non-stationary, world. We draw in-
spiration from recent work on the Minority Game [5], in
order to model a typical situation where a large num-
ber of agents pursue different individual goals, using a
certain number of distributed resources. Optimal use of
resources becomes then a complex coordination problem.
We focus on agents with finite memory and finite learn-
ing rates. We find that, when agents need to “learn”
collectively a fixed structure of interactions, they can at-
tain a close to optimal coordination, provided that their
memory extends far enough into the past. As the mem-
ory decreases, the system undergoes a phase transition
to a state where agents are unable to learn and play in a
random way.
More interestingly we find situations where the agents
are unable to coordinate and to converge to a Nash equi-
librium. Thus the game ends in a stationary regime with
no cooperation. This is a completely dynamical effect
which prevents the system from a proper convergence
to equilibrium and makes useless the standard analysis
based on Nash equilibria. This is a further clear evidence
of the relevance of tools and ideas of statistical mechanics
in the study of complex socio-economic systems, indeed
dynamical transitions are very well known in statistical
mechanics [6].
The model we study is closely related to the Minority
Game (MG). The reason for this choice is that this allows
us to benefit from the detailed understanding which has
been recently uncovered by the statistical mechanics ap-
proach [7,8]. On one hand we can make reference to exact
results, on the other we can extend our understanding of
this keystone model of complex adaptive systems.
The model is precisely defined as follows [5,7]: Agents
live in a world which can be in one of P states, labelled
by an integer µ = 1, . . . , P . Each agent i = 1, . . . , N can
choose between two personal strategies, labeled by a spin
variable si, which prescribe an action a
µ
si,i
for each state
1
µ. These actions are drawn from a bimodal distribution
for all i, s and µ, such that there are two possible actions,
do something (aµsi,i = 1) or do the opposite (a
µ
si,i
= −1).
The payoff received by an agent who plays strategy si,
while her opponents take strategies s−i = {sj, ∀j 6= i},
is, in the state µ,
uµi (si, s−i) = −aµsi,iAµ , (1)
where Aµ =
∑
j a
µ
sj ,j
. The total payoff to agents is al-
ways negative: The majority of agents receives a negative
payoff whereas only the minority of them gain.
The game is repeated many times; the state µ is drawn
from a uniform distribution ρµ = 1/P at each time and
agents try to estimate, on the basis of past observations,
which of their strategies is the best one. More precisely,
if si(t) is the strategy played by agent i at time t, we
assume as in [9] that
Prob[si(t) = s] ∝ exp [ΓUs,i(t)] , (2)
where Us,i(t) is the score of strategy s at time t and Γ is
a positive constant [10]. Each agent monitors the scores
Us,i(t) of each of her strategies s by
Us,i(t+ 1) = (1 − λ/P )Us,i(t) + uµi [s, s−i(t)]/P , (3)
where the last term is the payoff agent i would have re-
ceived if she had played strategy s at time t – see Eq. (1)
– against the strategies s−i(t) = {sj(t), ∀j 6= i} played
by her opponents at that time.
In words, Eqs. (2,3) model agents who play more
likely strategies which have performed better in the past.
Eqs. (2,3) belong to a class of learning models which has
received much attention recently [3].
The relevant parameter [11] is the ratio α = P/N be-
tween the “information complexity” P and the number
of agents, and the key quantity we shall look at is the
global efficiency defined as σ2 = 〈A2〉.
This model differs from the MG [5] for two important
aspects: First agents compute correctly the payoff for
strategies s 6= si(t) which they did not play. In the MG
agents only account for the explicit dependence of uµi on
s which arises from aµs,i – see Eq. (1) – whereas they ne-
glect the fact that if they had taken a different decision
also Aµ would have changed. This seems reasonable at
first sight because Aµ is an aggregate quantity and its
dependence on each individual agent is weak. A more
careful analysis [7,8] however shows that if agents prop-
erly account for their impact on Aµ as in Eq. (3) a radi-
cally different scenario arises: Rather than converging to
an unique stationary state as in the MG, the dynamics
(with λ = 0) converges to one of exponentially many (in
N) states – which are Nash equilibria [12] – character-
ized by an optimal coordination. This change emerges in
the statistical mechanics approach with the breakdown
of replica symmetry (RS): While the Minority Game is
described by a replica symmetric theory, Nash equilibria
are described by a full replica symmetry broken (RSB)
phase [8]. Our aim is precisely that of studying the co-
ordination of adaptive agents in a complex world with
exponentially many optimal states (Nash equilibria).
The second key feature is that previous work has only
explored the dynamics of learning with an infinite mem-
ory – i.e. with λ = 0 in Eq. (3) – and for a fixed structure
of interactions – i.e. with fixed (quenched) disorder aµs,i.
Our goal is to clarify the role of different time-scales in-
volved in the learning dynamics. We shall first study the
case where the structure of interactions is fixed – which
corresponds to aµs,i being the usual quenched disorder –
and then move to the more realistic case where the struc-
ture of interactions changes over long time-scales.
Following the lines of reasoning of Refs. [7,13], we
introduce a continuum time τ = Γt/P and variables
yi(τ) = Γ[U+,i(t) − U−,i(t)]/2 in terms of which the dy-
namics reads
dyi
dτ
= −λ
Γ
yi − hi −
∑
j 6=i
Ji,j tanh(yj) + ηi(τ) , (4)
hi =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
N∑
j=1
aµ+,i − aµ−,i
2
aµ+,j + a
µ
−,j
2
,
Ji,j =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
aµ+,i − aµ−,i
2
aµ+,j − aµ−,j
2
,
with ηi(τ) a white noise with zero mean and correlations
〈ηi(τ)ηj(τ ′)〉 ≃ Γσ
2
αN
δi,jδ(τ − τ ′) .
Refs. [7,13] have shown that, for λ = 0, the stationary
states of this dynamics are related to the local minima of
σ2 = H0 + 2
∑
i
himi +
∑
j 6=i
Ji,jmimj ,
whereH0 is a constant andmi = 〈tanh(yi)〉. These states
are also Nash equilibria [12], which means that agents
achieve an optimal coordination. Since σ2 takes its min-
ima for mi = ±1 – which correspond to yi → ±∞ – the
stochastic force ηi(t) is irrelevant in the late stages of the
dynamics, which is dominated by the deterministic drift
towards the Nash equilibrium.
For λ/Γ > 0 we expect the stochastic force ηi(τ),
whose strength is itself proportional to σ2, to compete
with the deterministic drift. Indeed the distribution of
yi will be cutoff for |yi| ≫ Γ/λ: For small λ we expect
that 〈tanh(yi)〉 is close to the values m(∞)i which mini-
mize σ2, and a spread in the distribution of yi around
its average which is maintained by the stochastic force.
When λ increases we expect a transition to a phase where
agents are unable to coordinate because their memory is
too short for learning correctly the interaction structure:
2
The dynamics is dominated by the stochastic force ηi,
which is made even stronger by the fact that σ2/N ≃ 1
is much larger than in the coordinated state. This tran-
sition is captured by the statistical mechanics approach
of Ref. [7]. Neglecting stochastic fluctuations induced by
ηi, which is legitimate only for Γ ≪ 1, one can easily
prove, following Ref. [7], that m
(λ)
i = 〈tanh yi〉 are given
by the solution of the minimization of the function
H = σ2 +
λ
Γ
∑
i
[
log(1−m2i ) + 2mi tanh−1(mi)
]
. (5)
In order to study the ground state properties of H we fol-
low the same steps of Ref. [7]: We introduce an inverse
temperature β, we compute the partition function and
the free energy per agent and then we take averages over
the disordered variables aµs,i with the replica method [14].
The free energy, within the RS Ansatz, reads
f(q, r,Q,R) =
α
β
ln
[
1 +
β(Q − q)
α
]
+
α
2
1 + q
α+ β(Q − q)
+
1−Q
2
− 1
β
〈ln
∫ 1
−1
dme−βVz(m)〉+ αβ
2
(RQ− rq) , (6)
where Q = 1
N
∑
i(mi)
2 and q = 〈maimbi〉 with a 6= b la-
belling different replicas of the systems; R and r arise
as Lagrange multipliers and Vz(m) = −
√
αrmz+ αβ2 (r−
R)m2+ λΓ [log(1−m2)+2m tanh−1(m)]. The ground state
properties of H are obtained solving the saddle point
equations [14] in the limit β →∞.
In the inset of Fig. 1 we compare the analytical predic-
tions for σ2 and Q with simulations results. We focus on
small α (i.e. α = 0.1) where the effects we wish to discuss
are more evident. Little discrepancies between numeri-
cal data and analytical curves are maybe due to RSB ef-
fects. Note that a phase transition occurs at λc ≃ 0.46Γ
where both σ2 and Q change their analytical behaviour.
We have studied this equilibrium phase transition in the
(λ, 1/Γ) plane, confirming the critical line λc = 0.46Γ:
Open symbols in Fig. 1 refer to a static experiment where
we let the system equilibrate to a Nash equilibrium for
λ = 0 and then we move it slowly along lines λΓ = const.
The situation changes when the system starts from
scratch [Us,i(0)=0 ∀{s, i}] in each run. Depending on λ
and Γ, the dynamics may lead the system to a station-
ary regime (different from the static one) which is char-
acterized by larger fluctuations (i.e. larger σ2). These
dynamical effects make the phase diagram more complex
in the λ < λc region (see Fig. 1): In I the system always
relaxes to the static equilibrium, in II it sometimes con-
verges to equilibrium and sometimes get trapped in the
metastable regime with large fluctuations, while in III it
never reaches equilibrium. The presence of this dynami-
cal transition implies that the analysis in terms of Nash
equilibria is no longer enough to predict the collective be-
havior of the system in a large part of the phase diagram,
i.e. for high learning rates and short memory.
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FIG. 1. Phase diagram: static (◦) and dynamic (•) critical
lines obtained from the simulation. The full line represents
the RS critical line. The dashed lines are guide to the eyes.
Inset: Q (•) and σ2/N (◦) as a function of λ/Γ obtained for
the simulation. The lines represent the RS solution.
When the external world is non-stationary, i.e. changes
with time, the adaptation task becomes still harder. We
mimic the external world modification as follows: Ev-
ery τ time steps a randomly chosen state of the world is
removed and a new one replaces it (in order to keep P
constant). Actually we randomly choose a µ index and
we re-extract the strategies aµs,i for all i and s.
Here we focus on the results of the simulations done
with τ = 103, Γ = ∞, NP = 104 and many λ values.
The results do not dependent on the initial conditions.
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FIG. 2. In a non-stationary world (τ = 103) the evolution
of σ2/N with simulation time for 50 different samples and two
values of λ (NP = 104, α = 0.1 and Γ =∞).
In the upper panel of Fig. 2 we show the relaxation
of σ2/N for λ = 2.5: As expected, it starts from 1 and
converges to its equilibrium value. Note that τ = 103
has been chosen in order to allow the system to reach a
cooperative behaviour before the world starts changing.
For this value of λ the system is robust with respect to
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changes of the world: Apart from occasional excursions
to states with large σ2, agents are able to adapt them-
selves to the evolving interaction structure.
In the lower panel we present the evolution of σ2/N
for λ = 3.5 (i.e. with shorter memory) in 50 different
samples. The behaviour is now completely different: Af-
ter having reached a low value of σ2/N (cooperation) the
system undergoes a sharp transition and σ2/N jumps to
a high value. The players are no longer able to adapt
to the changing world and they start playing in a wrong
way. Occasionally agents may achieve a good coordina-
tion with small σ2, but they eventually always go back
to uncoordinated states with large σ2.
For large times, the instantaneous values of σ2/N have
a roughly bimodal distribution: They are either low
(∼ 10−2) or high (∼ 1). In Fig. 3 we plot the average
of the low (◦) and of the high (✷) values (these averages
can be defined in an unambiguous way thanks to the gap
between low and high σ2 values). In the inset we report
the fraction of samples that spend the last decade in the
high σ2 regime. In a whole intermediate range around
λc ≈ 3.3 we find that coordinated states with small σ2
coexist with wildly fluctuating states (σ2 > 1).
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FIG. 3. Average low (◦) and high (✷) σ2/N as a func-
tion of λ (NP = 104, α = 0.1, Γ = ∞ and τ = 103).
The arrow indicates a transition from the cooperative to the
non-cooperative regime. The horizontal dotted line is the
σ2/N value with fixed world (τ = ∞). Inset: Probability of
being in a non-cooperative regime as a function of λ.
Is worth noticing some facts in Fig. 3. The minimum
of σ2, corresponding to the best cooperation, is no longer
located in λ = 0 (i.e. infinite memory). In other words,
in a non-stationary environment the agents play better
with a finite memory, which allows them to take deci-
sion based more on the recent past rather than on the
far past. The minimum they can attain is very near to
the σ2/N value in an unchanging world (shown with a
horizontal line in Fig. 3). The second remarkable fact
is that the transition from a coordinated state to a high
σ2 regime when λ increases – which was continuous in
a fixed world – shows features of first order transitions
such as discontinuities and phase coexistence.
In conclusion, we have extended the replica solution of
the Minority Game to the case where agents have finite
memory and finite learning rates. We have proven that a
phase transition between phases with low and high σ2 ex-
ists as a function of λ/Γ. We have also shown, by means
of computer simulations, that a dynamical phase transi-
tion exists for high values of λ (short memories), and that
this dynamic phase transition is responsible for a non-
cooperative behaviour of agents. Furthermore we have
shown, by numerical simulation, that when the structure
of the interactions is non-stationary, agents with infinite
memory behave worst than agents with a finite memory.
Under these conditions we recover again a scenario where
agents with too short memory display a first order tran-
sition from a cooperative to a non-cooperative phase.
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